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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH L. WADSWORTH 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah; R. P. HOLDSWORTH, 
DIRECTOR, THE SALT LAKE COUNTY 
FLOOD CONTROL DIVISION, 
Defendants/Appellants, 
Petition No. 
Priority No. 13 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Plaintiff and Appellee, Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction 
Company, Inc. ("Wadsworth"), pursuant to Rules 46-49 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, respectfully petitions the Court for 
Writ of Certiorari. This Petition is made on the grounds that (1) 
the issues presented are important questions of municipal and state 
law and, (2) the Court of Appeals did not address or rule upon the 
primary points presented on appeal /hich is a departure from the 
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings sufficient to 
call for exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision. 
QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether a wrongfully rejected bidder on a public 
construction project is entitled to any monetary relief, is an 
important question of municipal and state law which should be 
decided by the Supreme Court. 
1 
2. Whether the contractual enforceability of pre-award 
covenants between a municipality and a competitive bidding 
contractor, where significant mutual obligations supported by 
consideration were accepted by the parties, is an important 
question of municipal and state law which should be decided by the 
Supreme Court. 
3. Whether the Court of Appeals1 failure to address or rule 
upon the primary points presented on appeal is a sufficient 
departure from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings to call for exercise of the Supreme Court's power of 
supervision. 
REPORTS OF DECISIONS 
The decision of the Court of Appeals has been reported at 170 
Utah Adv.Rep. 52 (Ct.App., 9/30/91). 
JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS 
(A) The Court of Appeals Decision sought to be reviewed was 
entered September 30, 1991. 
(B) An order of the Utah Court of Appeals denying rehearing 
was entered on December 17, 1991. 
(C) The statutory authority for exercise of jurisdiction is 
Utah Code Ann., § 78-2-2(5) (1953 as amended). 
CONTROLLING LAWS 
The following are the controlling provisions of the Salt Lake 
County Ordinances involved in the case. 
Salt Lake County Ordinance, § 18-1-1: 
Except as otherwise herein provided, all county purchase 
orders and contracts of every kind, involving amounts in 
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excess of $5,000,00, for labor and services, or for the 
purchase, lease, or sale of personal property, materials, 
equipment or supplies, shall be let by competitive 
bidding after advertisement, to the lowest responsible 
bidder, or in the appropriate instance, to the highest 
responsible bidder, depending upon whether the county is 
to expend or to receive the money. 
Salt Lake County Ordinance, § 18-1-5: 
Any and all bids received in response to an advertisement 
may be rejected by the board of county commissioners if 
the bidder is not deemed responsible, or the character 
or quality of services, supplies, materials, equipment 
or labor does not conform to requirements, or if the 
public interest may otherwise be served thereby. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case involves the competitive bidding of a public 
construction project for Salt Lake County known as Scott Avenue. 
Basin on Millcreek at 800 East "No. 408" ("The Project") . Appellee 
Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction Company, Inc. ("Wadsworth") 
contends that Salt Lake County ("the County") wrongfully rejected 
its bid and failed to award the project contract to Wadsworth as 
the low, responsive, responsible bidder. Wadsworth seeks to 
recover for the wrongful rejection of its bid and breach of 
contract by Salt Lake County. The District Court entered Summary 
Judgment in favor of Wadsworth. 
Course of Proceedings Below 
On August 14, 1985, Salt Lake County determined Wadsworthfs 
Bid on the subject public construction project was non-responsive 
due to isolated and occasional pencil notations among the bid 
figures entered in ink on the Bid. (R. 278-80) . On or about August 
22, 1985, Salt Lake County awarded the project to the second low 
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bidder, Gerber Construction. (R. 80). On August 26, 1985, 
Wadsworth filed this action and moved for injunctive relief to 
preserve the status quo pending the resolution of this dispute. (R. 
2, 28). On August 26, 1985, a hearing was held regarding the 
injunctive relief sought by Wadsworth and the District Court 
entered a temporary restraining order on August 26, 1985. (R. 86, 
42-44). Further hearings were subsequently held on September 3 
and 5, 1985, regarding injunctive relief. (R. 28, 86). 
At the September 5, 1985, hearing on Wadsworth1s Motion for 
Injunctive Relief, the District Court, determined that Wadsworth's 
bid was responsive, that the penciled notations should have been 
ignored as not part of the bid, that Salt Lake County wrongfully 
rejected Wadsworth's bid, and that the project should have been 
awarded to Wadsworth as the lowest responsible bidder. (R. 176-
77) .1 
After the hearing, Wadsworth submitted a proposed order 
granting the injunctive relief. (R. 86). The County filed an 
objection to the order and another hearing was subsequently held 
on the County's objection on September 13, 1985. Although the 
Court had initially determined to grant an injunction, (R. 28) , the 
extended hearings and lapse of time permitted the second low bidder 
to continue on the project, thereby rendering injunctive relief 
At the hearing of September 5, 1985, the County indicated 
that work had already begun on the project by the second low 
bidder. Wadsworth, emphasized at the hearing that it was prepared 
to make any monetary adjustment necessary to avoid any prejudice 
to the County and the second low bidder in awarding the project to 
Wadsworth as required. (R. 157-61). 
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impractical. (R. 97). On November 22, 1985, the Court entered an 
Order denying the injunction, (R. 97), thereby leaving Wadsworth 
to pursue a remedy of damages, characterized by the Court as 
"incurring more costs to the County". (R. 177). 
Salt Lake County subsequently moved for summary judgment on 
the basis that no remedy was available to Wadsworth for the 
wrongful rejection of its bid. (R. 110). The County's Motion was 
denied on July 20, 1987. (R. 190). Wadsworth thereafter moved for 
summary judgment on its claim for damages for the wrongful 
rejection of its bid. (R. 224-84). The District Court granted 
Wadsworth's Motion on December 14, 1989. (R. 429-431). The County 
filed its Notice of Appeal on January 12, 1990 (R. 434-35). 
The Court of Appeals entered its opinion reversing the Summary 
Judgment on September 30, 1991. Wadsworth's petition for rehearing 
was denied December 17, 1991. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. On July 8, 1985, defendant Salt Lake County issued a 
public invitation to bid with Instructions to Bidders and Bid 
Schedule for the construction of Scott Avenue Basin on Millcreek 
at 800 East "No. 408". (R. 7, 246, 278). 
2. The last page of the Bid Schedule, Section 1.8.00, page 
6, of the subject bid documents, contains the following provision: 
The award of contract, if made, will be to the lowest 
responsive, responsible bidder pursuant to county 
ordinance. The county reserves the right to delete any 
bid schedule or item and to award any portion of the work 
depending upon the availability of the funds. 
(R. 262). 
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3. Section 1.2.06, on page two of the Instructions to 
Bidders, includes the following language requiring the low bidder 
to enter into a written contract with the County: 
Each proposal must be accompanied by a bid bond or a 
certified check on a bank in Salt Lake County, for 5% of 
the amount bid, which amount is agreed to by the bidder 
as liquidated damages due to Salt Lake County if he shall 
fail to execute the contract and furnish the required 
bonds, all within ten days after the acceptance of the 
proposal and the awarding of the contract by the Board 
of County Commissioners. 
(R. 247). 
4. The bid bond required by Salt Lake County under the bid 
documents contained the following provision requiring and 
guaranteeing, inter alia, that the contractor not withdraw his bid 
within the period specified or within 60 days after bid opening. 
Now, therefore, if the principal shall not withdraw said 
bid within the period specified therein after the opening 
of the same, or if no period be specified, within sixty 
(60) days after said opening, and shall within the period 
specified therefor, or, if no period be specified, within 
ten (10) days after the prescribed forms are presented 
to him for signature, enter into a written contract with 
the County, in accordance with the bid as accepted, and 
give bond with good and sufficient surety or sureties, 
as may be required, for the faithful performance and 
proper fulfillment of such contract, or in the event of 
the withdrawal of said bid within the period specified, 
or the failure to enter into such contract and give such 
bond within the time specified, if the principal shall 
pay the County the difference or failure to enter into 
such contract and give such bond within the time 
specified, if the principal shall pay the County the 
difference between the amount specified in said bid and 
the amount for which the County may procure the required 
work and/or supplies if the latter amount be in excess 
of the former, then the above obligation shall be void 
and of no effect, otherwise to remain in full force and 
virtue. 
(R. 263). 
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5. Section 1.2.04 of the subject Instruction to Bidders 
contained the following provision requiring the bidder to submit 
its bid unit prices in ink or typed: 
On the bidding schedule of the proposal form the unit 
prices shall be written in ink or typed both in words and 
numerals. In cases of discrepancy, the amount in words 
shall be construed to be the desired amount. 
(R. 247) 
6. Pursuant to the invitation to bid and Instructions to 
Bidders, Wadsworth submitted to Salt Lake County its bid schedule, 
written in ink and its total bid was also written in ink upon the 
forms specified in the contract documents. ( R. 251-62; 279; 438, 
pp. 9 - 15; R. 439, pp. 7 - 8 ) . 
7. All amounts in the Bid Schedule submitted by Wadsworth 
were entered in ink and the bid contained over one hundred eighty 
(180) ink entries. Inscribed upon the Bidding Schedule submitted 
by Wadsworth were isolated light pencil notations. The occasional 
pencil notations appeared at only five (5) places among the more 
than one hundred eighty (180) separate entries in ink. (R. 251-
62) . The County states that it has lost the original Bid Schedule 
and only copies are available for scrutiny. 
8. The isolated pencil notations on the Bid Schedule were 
incidental notes written during last minute telephone discussions 
between Ralph Wadsworth at the County Purchasing Division and Guy 
Wadsworth at Wadsworth's offices concerning the bid. The pencil 
notations do not add up or correlate with each other. The pencil 
notations were not erased due to lack of time to turn in the bid. 
(R. 438 at p. 9 - 14; R. 439 at pp. 6 - 8 ) . 
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9. At the general bid opening, on or about July 29, 1985, 
Wadsworth's inked bid figure of $692,634.48 was publicly read and 
Wadsworth was designated by the County's representatives as the 
low apparent bidder on said project. (R. 280, 438 at p. 22). 
10. The bid of Gerber Construction Company on the project 
was the sum of $739,374.92. (R. 281). 
11. On July 31, 1985, after the bid opening, a representative 
of the County, contacted Wadsworth regarding the bid submitted by 
the Wadsworth and Wadsworth confirmed that its bid was in the sum 
of $692,634.48. (R. 281, 439 at pp. 8 - 9 ) . Wadsworth stated that 
only the figures written in ink were intended to be part of the bid 
and if it had intended to use the figures written in pencil 
Wadsworth would have written them in ink. (R. 438 at pp. 12 - 14) . 
12. Wadsworth again confirmed its bid in the amount of 
$692,634.48, in response to the contact referred to in the 
proceeding paragraph, in a letter to Salt Lake County dated July 
31, 1985. (R. 439 at p. 13). 
13. On or about August 14, 1985, Salt Lake County rejected 
the bid of Wadsworth as non-responsive due to the pencil notations 
on the bid and awarded the contract to the second low bidder over 
the objection of Wadsworth. (R. 268-70, 272) 
14. At the County Commission meeting concerning Wadsworth's 
bid, Commissioner Barker stated that it was clear that Wadsworth 
intended the inked figure of $692,634.48 as its bid. The County 
Commission, nevertheless, rejected Wadsworth's bid as non-
responsive. (R. 438 at pp. 20 - 21) . 
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15. The County admits that Wadsworth is a responsible 
contractor and bidder. (R. 282). 
16. Wadsworth calculated and included in its bid of 
$692,643.48, an amount of $62,344.15 to be the amount of profit 
Wadsworth calculated it would earn on the project if awarded the 
contract. (R. 227) . This amount was calculated based upon 
subcontract bids and prices for materials and labor available to 
Wadsworth at the time of the project. (R. 227). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED THE CASE WITHOUT ADDRESSING 
THE PRIMARY ISSUES BEFORE IT, AND THE SUPREME COURT 
SHOULD EXERCISE ITS SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY. 
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states that 
a writ of certiorari will be considered where "the Court of Appeals 
has rendered a decision that has so far departed from the accepted 
and usual course of judicial proceedings...as to call for an 
exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision. Rule 30(c) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "When a 
judgment, decree, or order is reversed...the reasons shall be 
stated concisely in writing and filed with the clerk." This 
necessarily implies that the opinion of the Court of Appeals must 
address and rule upon all of the primary issues raised by the 
parties which bear on the decision. The Court of Appeals1 decision 
in this case fails to address or rule upon the primary issues 
raised by Wadsworth. The practical effect of the Court of Appeals1 
decision is to effectively deny Wadsworth its day in Court and a 
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Writ of Certiorari is necessary to avoid the obvious prejudice to 
Wadsworth. Clarmont Marine Sales, Inc. v. Harmon, 347 So.2d 839, 
841 (Fla. 1977). 
A. The Court of Appeals Failed to Address Wadsworth's Factual and 
Legal Arguments that the Contractual Obligations Between the County 
and Wadsworth are Authorized by Ordinance and Approved by the 
County Commission. 
The Court of Appeals states at page three of its opinion, that 
"[n]o contract is binding on the County. . .until it has been 
approved by the Board or authorized by ordinance or resolution." 
The opinion then erroneously states that Wadsworth presented no 
argument that the contract was authorized by ordinance or 
resolution. To the contrary, the primary thrust of Wadsworth's 
brief is that Salt Lake County Ordinance, § 18-1-1, expressly 
authorized and required the contract, and that the County 
Commission approved the contract when it approved the bidding of 
the project under the ordinance and provisions for contracting with 
the low bidder. (Wadsworth Brief pp. 11-16). 
Wadsworth argued that Salt Lake County was authorized and 
required, under its own ordinance to award the subject construction 
project and contract with Wadsworth as the low, responsible bidder. 
Revised Statutes of Salt Lake County, § 18-1-1, provides that the 
contract "...shall be let by competitive bidding after 
advertisement, to the lowest responsible bidder..." The bid 
documents prepared by the County further provide that "the award 
of contract, if made, would be to the lowest, responsive, 
responsible bidder, pursuant to county ordinance." (R. 262). Salt 
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Lake County had a mandatory duty to award the construction contract 
to the low responsible bidder.2 
The opinion refers to Salt Lake County Ordinance, § 2.04.1003 
which requires the contract be approved by the County Commission 
or be authorized by ordinance or resolution. As argued in 
Wadsworth's brief, the contract in this case was authorized and 
required by County ordinance § 18-1-1, which requires contracting 
with the low bidder. The County Commission expressly approved the 
contract when it approved bidding under this ordinance and the bid 
instructions requiring the contract with the low bidder. 
Furthermore, the contract was approved by the County Commission 
when it approved bidding of the project and the contract documents 
upon which bids were required to be based. (Wadsworth brief, p. 
16). Furthermore, the more specific ordinance § 18-1-1 requiring 
the contract with the low bidder controls over the more generalized 
ordinance § 2.04.100. Floyd v. Western Surgical Associates, 773 
P.2d 401 (Utah App. 1989). 
Fowler v. City of Anchorage, 583 P.2d 817, 820 (Alaska 
1978); Carpet City, Inc. v. Stillwater Municipal Hospital 
Authority, 536 P.2d 335 (Oklahoma 1975); Gerard Construction 
Company v. City of Manchester, 415 A.2d 1137, 1139-40 (N.H. 1980); 
R. E. Short Company v. City of Minneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331, 343 
(Minn. 1978). It has similarly been stated that "since government 
by conduct sets an example for all of us, it, above all, must obey 
its own laws." Swinerton & Walberg Company v. City of Inglewood, 
etc. , 114 Cal.Rptr. 834, 838 (1974) (citing Holmstead v United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 485, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944, 960 (1928). 
Salt Lake County was bound by its own ordinance to award the 
contract to Wadsworth as the low, responsible bidder on the 
project. 
The designation of this ordinance at the relevant time in 
this matter was Section 1-2-9, Salt Lake County Ordinances. 
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The Court of Appeals failed to address or rule upon the issue 
of whether the contract was authorized by ordinance and approved 
by the County commission. In fact, the opinion erroneously states 
Wadsworth made no such argument. Wadsworth, therefore, is entitled 
to have the Supreme Court review this matter giving consideration 
to, and ruling upon, this central issue of the case. 
B. The Court of Appeals1 Opinion Fails to Address the Factual and 
Legal Issues Which Distinguish this Case from The Rapp Decision 
upon which the Opinion was Based. 
The Court of Appeals1 decision that no contractual 
relationship existed between Salt Lake County and Wadsworth and 
that the County was not required to award to Wadsworth is based 
upon Rapp v. Salt Lake City, 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 1974). The 
decision does not address Wadsworthfs argument that the Rapp 
decision is clearly distinguishable from the present case in that 
different legal issues were presented. The Rapp case did not 
involve an ordinance, as in this case, requiring award to the 
lowest responsible bidder, but rather was based only upon a more 
generalized ordinance requiring approval of contracts by the city 
council.4 Rapp dealt only with the general common law duty of a 
municipality not to act with bad faith, fraud or collusion with 
respect to awarding contracts and with principles of implied 
contract. The issues in this case involve express obligations, not 
A 
Such a general ordinance cannot override the specific 
requirement in Section 18-1-1 which contains the mandatory 
requirement that the project shall be awarded to the low bidder. 
Floyd v. Western Surgical Associates, 773 P.2d 401, 404 (Utah App. 
1989) . 
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discussed in Rapp, imposed by County ordinance and an express 
promise in the bid documents to award the project to the low 
responsible bidder. The Court of Appeals failed to address these 
important distinctions. 
The Rapp case was based upon the reasoning that an ordinary 
invitation for bids is not an offer to be accepted by the bidder 
but only a request for offers from the bidder. In the present 
case, the Invitation for Bids was much more than an ordinary 
invitation or advertisement for bids. The County let the project 
for bid under Salt Lake County Ordinance, § 18-1-1, and written bid 
provisions expressly providing that the project would be awarded 
to the low bidder according to the contract documents upon which 
the bids were based. When Wadsworth submitted its bid, it agreed 
in return to undertake significant obligations to the County. The 
County required Wadsworth to covenant to hold its bid open for 60 
days, to provide a bid bond on which Wadsworth was liable to the 
County and, further, to enter into the final contract upon 
satisfaction of the condition that it was the lowest responsible 
bidder. (R. 247, 248, 263). Additionally, the County's bid 
documents provided for liquidated and other contractual measures 
of damages in the event Wadsworth failed to enter into the contract 
if it was the low bidder. (R. 263, 247, 248). The circumstances 
presented in this case go well beyond the ordinary and plain 
request for bids addressed in Rapp. 
Furthermore, the Rapp case did not address the fundamental 
principles of contract law discussed below which, when applied to 
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the particular facts of this case clearly establish a mutuality of 
obligation on the part of the parties and contractual obligations 
between Wadsworth and Salt Lake County. None of these important 
distinctions or issues were addressed by the Court of Appeals and 
require attention by the Supreme Court in deciding the issues 
presented on this appeal. 
C. The Court of Appeals1 Opinion Fails to Address the Issue 
Whether the Mutual Obligations Agreed to by Wadsworth in Return for 
the County's Obligation to Award to Wadsworth Created Mutual 
Contractual Obligations. 
The Court of Appeals1 did not address the effect of the mutual 
obligations and consideration between the parties which establish 
the contract asserted by Wadsworth. The County bid documents and 
ordinance required award and contract with Wadsworth as the low 
responsible bidder. In return Wadsworth undertook significant 
contractual obligations. Without addressing these issues, the 
impact of the Court of Appeals1 decision that no contractual 
obligation exists on the part of the County is that the obligations 
purportedly imposed by the County, and other municipalities, in its 
bid instructions and documents are illusory and unenforceable. 
When Salt Lake County requested bids, it promised to award the 
contract to the lowest responsible bidder under § 18-1-1. 
Swinerton & Walberg Company v. City of Inglewood, etc., 40 
Cal.App.3d 104, 114 Cal.Rptr. 834, 838 (1974). The County's 
promise to award the contract to the low responsible bidder was 
supported by consideration in the form of Wadsworth's covenants, 
inter alia, to hold the bid open for sixty days, to provide a bid 
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bond, and to be liable for contractual liquidated damages if it 
failed to perform the project if the low bidder. 
Where a promise, such as the County's promise to award to the 
low responsible bidder, is supported by another promise or other 
consideration, such as the covenants made by Wadsworth, the promise 
is enforceable and a binding contract is formed. Resource 
Management Co. v Western Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028, 1036 (Utah 1985); 
Suqarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 
1980). Wadsworth1s remedy for breach of such contract is recovery 
from the County of Wadsworth1s lost profits. Alexander v. Brown, 
646 P. 2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982). 
Although the commission purported to reject Wadsworthfs bid, 
this is not the same as disapproving the contract itself but rather 
a breach of the contract already approved, authorized and required 
by the County's ordinance. The County's right to reject 
Wadsworth's bid was restricted. § 18-1-5 of the County's 
ordinances only allows rejection of a bid for a "valid reason" and 
is limited to where the bidder is not "responsible". It is 
undisputed that Wadsworth is a responsible contractor. Where no 
valid reason for rejecting the bid exists, the purported rejection 
of the bid cannot be construed as disapproval of the bid process 
or contract authorized and required by § 18-1-1. 
In Butler v. Federal Way School Dist. No. 210, 562 P.2d 271 
(Wash.App.1977), the Court upheld an award of monetary damages for 
wrongful rejection of a contractor's bid. The Court held that 
where applicable ordinances limit the right to reject bids, as does 
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§ 18-1-5 in this case, the request for bids is itself an offer to 
contract with the low responsible bidder. Id. at 275. When the 
contractor submits the low responsible bid, the contractor has a 
statutory right to award of the contract, absent valid reasons for 
rejection of the bid. Id. at 275. Where the bid is improperly 
rejected, the contractor is entitled to monetary damages for the 
breach. Id. at 276. The limitations in § 18-1-1 on rejections of 
bids in this case, is another important distinction from the Rapp 
case. Where Wadsworth was undisputedly the low responsible bidder 
but was nevertheless rejected5, it is entitled to recover its 
damages suffered as a result of such wrongful rejection. 
The County contends that there is no contract until formal 
award and signing of the construction contract. However, "the fact 
that part of the performance is that the parties will enter into 
a contract in the future does not render the original agreement any 
less binding." Allen Steel Company v. Deseret Title Holding 
Corporation, 119 Utah Adv.Rep. 6 (October 6, 1989) . The pre-award 
mutual covenants and obligations between Wadsworth and the County 
clearly establish a binding contractual obligation on the part of 
both parties to enter into the construction contract upon which the 
bid was based. 
The Court of Appeals also failed to address the issue of 
whether or not Wadsworthfs bid was wrongfully rejected. The 
implication from the opinion is that actions by municipalities in 
awarding or rejecting bids are not subject to review even if in 
contravention of the governing ordinances or statutes. This is an 
important question of municipal law which should be decided by this 
Court. 
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The Court of Appealsf opinion does not address these issues 
or the incongruity of the County's argument that there is no 
contract despite the mutual obligations of the parties. The 
obligations the County imposed upon Wadsworth can only be binding 
if there is some consideration to support these obligations. The 
consideration here, is the County's obligation to award to the low 
bidder. The issue has widespread impact in the construction 
industry as to the effect, enforceability and validity of pre-
award covenants and bid bonds between the municipality and the 
competitive bidder. The Supreme Court should consider and rule 
upon these issues which are central to the appeal but ignored by 
the Court of Appeals. 
POINT II 
THE ISSUES PRESENTED ARE IMPORTANT ISSUES OF MUNICIPAL 
AND STATE LAW EFFECTING THE OPERATION AND INTEGRITY OF 
THE PUBLIC COMPETITIVE BIDDING SYSTEM IN THE STATE OF 
UTAH AND SHOULD BE DECIDED BY THE SUPREME COURT. 
The Court must consider the effect and ramifications on the 
entire public competitive bidding system in the State of Utah if 
the Court holds there is no contractual obligation. Salt Lake 
County, as well as most state agencies and municipalities in the 
State of Utah, impose important obligations on public bidding 
contractors to hold bids open for specified time periods, to 
provide bid bonds to guarantee the contractor will perform if the 
low bidder, and provisions for contractual liquidated damages for 
withdrawing a low bid and refusing to perform the work for the bid 
amount. 
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The result of the Court of Appeal's decision that there is no 
contractual obligation between the parties is to open the door for 
low bidders on public projects to ignore these important bid 
provisions designed to protect the municipality. If the bid is 
merely an offer and there is no contractual obligation on the 
County to award to the low bidder, then there cannot be any 
contractual obligation on the bidder and the obligations 
purportedly accompanying the bid are also unenforceable. Low 
bidders will be permitted to withdraw their bids after opening and 
then negotiate for higher prices between its low bid and the next 
low bid. The integrity of the bidding system will be destroyed. 
This threat to the foundation of public competitive bidding 
undermines the purpose of such bidding. The Court of Appeals1 
opinion points out that the competitive bidding is for the benefit 
of the public. Opinion, p.4. The bidding process is also intended 
to provide a fair forum for bidders. Piatt Elec. Sup, Inc. v. City 
of Seattle Div. of Pur, 555 P.2d 421, 426 (Wash.App. 1976) . The 
protection of the public and integrity of the bidding process 
requires meaningful enforcement of the ordinances governing the 
bidding process, i.e. monetary damages to wrongfully rejected 
bidders. Otherwise, contractors will lose faith in the bidding 
process, fewer contractors will bid, less competition will result 
and the public will pay higher prices. If the bidding laws 
regulations are not adequately enforceable by those participating, 
then such regulations are rendered ineffectual and the intended 
protection of the public and bidding contractors illusory. 
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The practical necessity of providing an adequate remedy in the 
form of monetary damages was recognized in Airline Const, v. 
Ascension Parish School, 549 So.2d 1240 (La.App. 1989), where the 
Court rejected the argument that a wrongfully rejected bidder was 
limited to injunctive relief only and could not recover monetary 
damages. 
We believe these cases recognize that it would be unfair 
to establish a rule under which aggrieved bidders would 
in all instances be barred from obtaining monetary 
damages for violations of the Public Contracts Law. The 
inequities of such a ruling are particularly telling in 
situations wherein an aggrieved bidder files an 
injunction suit prior to or immediately in response to 
an alleged wrongful award of a contract, but due to the 
lapse of time before a determination on the merits can 
be made, the project is near completion. The bidder in 
reality may no longer enjoin the project. It would be 
unfair to rule that the bidder in this scenario would not 
be entitled to some relief, perhaps in the form of 
monetary damages. 
Id. at 1246. The need to provide an adequate monetary remedy is 
particularly evident where Wadsworth promptly filed this action and 
sought injunctive relief and where the remedy of injunctive relief 
failed as the result of the extended hearings and lapse of time 
which rendered injunctive relief impractical. 
The ordinances and bidding instructions in this case have a 
dual purpose to protect the bidders as well as the general public. 
Piatt Elec. , 555 P. 2d at 426. Both purposes suffer if Wadsworth 
is denied a remedy since the County would then be given free reign 
to arbitrarily ignore its obligation under the ordinance with 
impunity, thereby undermining the integrity and value of 
competitive bidding. Where Wadsworth's bid was wrongfully rejected 
in violation of the ordinance and written covenants of the County, 
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an appropriate remedy must be fashioned to effectuate the purposes 
of public competitive bidding. These important issues of municipal 
and state law go to the heart of the public competitive bidding 
process in this state and should be decided by the Supreme Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals1 opinion ignores and fails to address 
primary and significant issues presented by Wadsworth on this 
appeal. The Court of Appeals1 failure to address or rule upon the 
central issues presented on appeal is a departure from the accepted 
and usual judicial procedure, and calls for review by the Supreme 
Court. Normal judicial process and fundamental fairness requires, 
at a minimum, that the issues presented to the Court of Appeals be 
addressed and ruled upon and not simply ignored. Furthermore, the 
issues regarding the purpose and integrity of public competitive 
bidding, protection of the public, and the need for a meaningful 
remedy to wrongfully rejected bidders to enforce the public bidding 
laws are important issues of municipal and state law which should 
be decided by the Supreme Court. Wadsworth, therefore, 
respectfully requests that its Petition for Writ of Certiorari and 
review of the Court of Appeals' decision be granted. 
Dated this /Jjr day of January, 1992. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Memorandum were mailed, United States Mail, first class, 
postage prepaid, this l^^day of January, 1992 to the following: 
David E. Yocum 
Jeffery H. Thorpe 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction 
Company, Inc, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Salt Lake County, a political 
subdivision of the State of Utah; 
R. P. Holdsworth, Director, The 
Salt Lake County Flood Control 
Division, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
DEC 171991 
;^ar/ 1' Noonso 
ORDER DENY$f®^" ? h e C o u r t 
PETITION FOR RfiRBJti&JWEJ APP e a l s 
Case NO. 900234-CA 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon appellant's 
Petition for Rehearing, filed October 15, 1991, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing is denied. 
Dated this ,4^  !(C day of December, 1991. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Mary T/Noonan 
Clerk\ / f . - the court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 17th day of December, 1991, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 
REHEARING was deposited in the United States mail to the parties 
listed below: 
David E. Yocom 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
Jeffrey H. Thorpe 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State, Suite S3700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190-1200 
Wilford A. Beesley 
Stanford P. Fitts 
Beesley & Fairclough 
Attorneys at Law 
310 Deseret Book Building 
40 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Dated this 17th day of December, 1991. 
By - _J/t U *;<Vc;//_/Tn 
Deputy Cl£rk 
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OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 900234-CA 
F I L E D 
(September 30, 1991) 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable James S. Sawaya 
SEP 3 01991 
MJKWT Noonan 
Clerkc : --Court 
Utah Co-.*.» or Appeals 
Attorneys: David E. Yocom and Jeffrey H. Thorpe, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellant 
Wilford A. Beesley and Stanford P. Fitts, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Jackson, and Orme. 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction Company, Inc. (Wadsworth) 
was the unsuccessful bidder on a public works project in Salt 
Lake County (the County) and sued for damages on contract and 
negligence theories. The trial court awarded Wadsworth damages 
for lost profits on a motion for summary judgment and the County 
appealed. We reverse and remand. 
I. FACTS 
On July 8, 1985, the County invited competitive, sealed bids 
by advertisement for construction of the Scott Avenue Basin flood 
control project on Millcreek. The bid advertisement contained 
instructions and rules governing the bid.1 Wadsworth received 
1. The bid instructions required unit prices to be written in 
ink or typed both in words and numerals. The instructions 
(continued...) 
the bid advertisement and, along with Gerber Concrete 
Construction, Inc. (Gerber), bid the project. When the bids were 
opened and the figures read publicly, Wadsworth was designated as 
the apparent low bidder, pending final approval by the County 
Board of Commissioners (the Board). 
The County consulting engineers subsequently reviewed the 
bids and discovered irregularities in Wadsworth's bid. In 
addition to minor computation errors that could be corrected, 
Wadsworth1s bid contained a six digit figure that had been 
penciled in above another number written in ink for the cost of 
the line item "basin floodwall." Both numbers were added to 
other line items in separate calculations of the subtotal for the 
concrete floodwalls. Two different numbers appeared, one in pen 
and one in ink, in the subtotal column on the bid schedule. The 
pencil and ink figures from the subtotal column on the bid 
schedule were again listed in the summary of subtotals and 
entered in the box for the total bid price. The figures 
reflected substantial price differences. Wadsworth's total high 
and low figures straddled Gerber1s total bid price. The 
consultants recommended that the Board reject Wadsworth's bid as 
not responsive to the bid request. 
On August 14, 1985, the Board held a public hearing to 
review the bid proposals. At the hearing, Wadsworth argued the 
Board could waive the irregularities. Wadsworth had previously 
sent a letter to the County shortly after bids were opened to 
clarify the "confusion as to which number should be used." A 
county attorney advised against waiver, and the Board rejected 
Wadsworth's bid as not responsive and awarded the contract to 
Gerber. Wadsworth then sought to enjoin Gerber from starting 
construction by filing suit in district court, but the court 
allowed the work to go forward. 
When the flood control project was completed, the County 
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the equitable 
relief Wadsworth sought had been rendered moot and that Wadsworth 
was not entitled to the damages requested. The court granted the 
motion in part and denied injunctive relief, but ruled that 
Wadsworth could seek damages for wrongful rejection of its bid. 
Wadsworth then moved for summary judgment and was awarded damages 
for lost profits on contract and negligence theories. The County 
appealed. 
1. (...continued) 
expressly prohibited erasure, interlineation or other correction 
unless such corrections were authenticated by the signature of 
the person signing the bid. 
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is proper only if there are no genuine 
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment in its favor as a matter of law. Thornock v. Cook. 604 
P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979). Because disposition of a case by 
summary judgment denies the benefit of trial on the merits, we 
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing 
party. Reeves v. Geiav Pharmaceutical. Inc.. 764 P.2d 636, 640 
(Utah App. 1988). Moreover, because summary judgment is granted 
as a matter of law, we are free to reappraise the legal 
conclusion of the trial court. Luckv Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark. 
755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah App. 1988). 
III. REJECTION OF THE BID 
A. Contractual Theory 
The issue of whether an unsuccessful bidder on a public 
works project is entitled to contractual damages was decided in 
Rapp v. Salt Lake City, 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 1974). In Rapp. the 
supreme court denied recovery of damages by an aggrieved bidder 
under either express or implied contract theories. Id. at 655. 
"An ordinary advertisement for a bid is not itself an offer," the 
court reasoned, "rather the bid or tender is an offer which 
creates no rights until accepted." Id. at 654. The supreme 
court also acknowledged that, pursuant to ordinance, formal 
acceptance by the governing authority was required to create a 
binding contract. Id. 
In the present case, the Board is empowered by ordinance to 
make contracts on behalf of the County. No contract is binding 
on the County, however, until it has been approved by the Board 
or authorized by ordinance or resolution.2 In this case, the 
Board did not approve Wadsworth's bid, but in fact, rejected it 
before any work was commenced on the project. Therefore, no 
contract was created, either express or implied, that would give 
Wadsworth contractual rights. Accordingly, damages for 
2. Salt Lake County, Utah, Code of Ordinances, § 2.04.100 
(1990). 
The commission shall make or authorized [sic] the 
making of all contracts to which the county may be a 
party, and no contract shall be entered into on behalf 
of or be binding on the county unless it is reduced to 
writing and approved by the commission, or expressly 
authorized by ordinance or resolution. 
Wadsworth presents no argument that a binding contract was 
created by ordinance or resolution. Accordingly, we do not 
address either of those provisions of the ordinance. 
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anticipated lost profits were inappropriate under either express 
or implied contract theories. 
B. Negligence Theory 
The issue of whether a contractor who is the apparent low 
bidder on a public works contract is entitled to recover damages 
for lost profits for wrongful rejection of its bid is a case of 
first impression in Utah. A substantial majority of the 
jurisdictions that have ruled on the issue have not allowed an 
aggrieved low bidder to recover damages for the failure of a 
public body to award a contract.3 We adopt the majority 
approach and hold that damages for lost profits are not 
recoverable under negligence theory as a matter of Utah common 
law.4 
The rationale for our holding is that the laws governing 
competitive bidding are enacted for the benefit of the general 
taxpaying public and not individual bidders. See Gulf Oil Corp. 
v. Clark County. 94 Nev. 116, 575 P.2d 1332, 1333 (1978). A 
violation of those laws, therefore, is a breach of a duty owed to 
the public and not to an individual. Because damages benefit 
only the interest of an individual bidder, an award of damages 
for lost profits in such instances is contrary to the very public 
interest that the competitive bidding laws were designed to 
3. See City of Scottsdale v. Deem. 27 Ariz.App. 480, 556 P.2d 
328 (1976); Klinaer v. City of Favetteville, 297 Ark. 385, 762 
S.W.2d 388 (1988); Rubino v. Lolli, 10 Cal.App.3d 1059, 89 
Cal.Rptr. 320 (1970); Sutter Bros. Constr. Co. Inc. v. City of 
Leavenworth, 238 Kan. 85, 708 P.2d 190 (1985); Baker v. State. 
707 P.2d 20 (Mont. 1985); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Clark County. 94 Nev. 
116, 575 P.2d 1332 (1978); M. A. Stephen Constr. Co. v. Borough 
of Rumson, 125 N.J.Super. 67, 308 A.2d 380, cert, denied, 64 N.J. 
315, 315 A.2d 404 (1973); R.S. Noonan. Inc. v. School District of 
Citv of York. 400 Pa. 391, 162 A.2d 623 (1960); Mottner v. Town 
of Mercer Island, 75 Wash.2d 575, 452 P.2d 750 (1969). See also 
Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations. § 29.86 (3rd 
Ed. 1990); Annotation, Public Contracts; Low Bidder's Monetary 
Relief against State or Local Agency for Nonaward of Contract. 65 
A.L.R.4th 93 (1988); 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Works and Contracts § 
86 (1972). 
4. Since Wadsworth did not seek to recover its bid preparation 
costs, we have no occasion to consider the issue. See Hever 
Products Co.. Inc. v. United States, 135 Ct. CI. 63, 140 F.Supp. 
409 (1956)(unsuccessful bidder may recover bid preparation costs 
where bids are not invited in good faith). We also note, in 
passing, that counties are not included within the scope of the 
Utah Procurement Code and the remedies therein provided. Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 63-56-2, -5(12), -5(25), -47 (1989). 
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protect. In addition, damages for lost profits further burden 
the public coffers already penalized by paying a higher price for 
goods or services. See City of Scottsdale v. Deem. 27 Ariz.App. 
480, 556 P.2d 328, 330 (1976). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We conclude that Wadsworth was not entitled to damages for 
lost profits under either contract or negligence theories. We 
therefore vacate the summary judgment and remand the case for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Russell W. Bench, Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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Telephone: (801) 538-2100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH L. WADSWORTH 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political : 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah; R. P. HOLDSWORTH, : 
DIRECTOR, THE SALT LAKE COUNTY 
FLOOD CONTROL DIVISION, : 
Defendants. ; 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
: Civil No. C-85-5681 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
The Motion of plaintiff Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction 
Company, Inc. for Summary Judgment came on regularly before the 
above entitled Court on November 20, 1989 at 2:00 p.m., the 
Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding. Plaintiff was represented by 
Wilford A. Beesley, Esq. and Stanford P. Fitts, Esq. and defendants 
were represented by Jeffrey H. Thorpe, Esq. The Court, having 
considered the memoranda submitted and arguments of counsel and 
being fully advised in the premises, HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND 
DECREES: 
1. The Motion for Summary Judgment of plaintiff Ralph L. 
Wadsworth Construction Company, Inc. is hereby granted as prayed. 
2. Defendants were required to award the subject construction 
project to the low, responsive, responsible bidder. 
3. Plaintiff was the low, responsive, responsible bidder on 
the subject project and defendants should have awarded the project 
to plaintiff. 
4. Defendants breached contractual duties and duties of due 
care owing to plaintiff in rejecting plaintiff's bid as 
nonresponsive. 
5. Plaintiff is entitled to recover from defendants and each 
of them in the amount of $62,344.15 together with plaintiff's costs 
incurred in this matter and prejudgment interest at the statutory 
rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from March 27, 1987 until the 
date of judgment. 
6. Plaintiff is entitled to post judgment interest at the 
statutory rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of 
this Judgment until paid in full. 
Dated this /*~r day of December, 1989. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
imes S. Sawa^a 
District Court Judge 
on 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to be hand delivered to the following this _/j/_clay of 
December, 1989: 
Jeffery H. Thorpe 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
